Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1972

Gary L Reich, et al v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary District No.
1 : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Skeen and Skeen; Attorneys for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Reich v. Salt Lake Sanitary, No. 12890 (1972).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5144

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN TIIE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GARY L. REICH, et a.I.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No.
12890

vs.

SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT NO. 1,
Defendant-A.ppellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the .Judgment of the Third .Judicial District Court i.
Salt Lake County, Honorable .Joseph G • .Jeppson, J'wlge

HANSON, BRANDT &
WADSWORTH, by
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH
702 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant

SKEEN AND SKEl!lN
536 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys fo~ Respondents

FILED
R i912
NOV

----------·
Cled. SuprMlll Court, Utah

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
NATURE OF CASE .............................................. l
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT .............. l
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ...................... 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................... 2
STATEMENT OF POINTS .............................. 10
ARGUMENT ............................................................ 10
POINT I. THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR IS APPLICABLE TO THE
FACTS O:F THE INSTANT CASE ................... 10
POINT II. THE DECISION OF THE
COURT AND JURY AMOUNT TO A FINDING OF ACTUAL NEGLIGENCE AND ARE
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ............. 20
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22

CASES CITED
Anello vs. Kansas City, 286 SW 2d 49 (Mo. app.
1955) ............................................................ 17, 18

City of Elkhart vs. Slabaugh, (Ind. app. 1959),
157 NE 2d 842 ................................................ 17, 18
1

Page

Freitag vs. Cit;IJ of Montello, 153 N'V 2d 505
('Vis. 1 g67) -----------------------····----------------·--------·-··-- 17
Lund vs. Phillips Petroleum Company, 10 Utah
2d 276, 351 P. 2d 952 (1960) --------···---······-··· 11, 15

Lund vs. Mountain Fuel, 15 Utah 2d 10, 386 P.2d
408 ( 1936) ---·--·--··----------------·------·-·------·-------- 12, 17
Moore vs. James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P. 2d 221
( 1956) ------------------------------------·----------------·-·-------· 13, 17
Rotella vs. McGovern, 288 A 2d 261 (R.I. 1972) 18, 20

S amone vs. J. C. Penney Company, 17 Utah 2d 46,
404 P. 2d 248 (1965) ---·---·--··------------·····---------··--·· 14

Scott vs. The London & St. Katherine Dock Co.,
3 H & C 596, 13 ,V. R. 410; 13 LT 148;
159 Eng. RRP 665 ( 1865) ---·---·---------·----·--··--·-· 11
Talcott vs. New York, 69 NYS 360 (N. Y. 1901)
·--·-·-·----------------·-·-···----·-·-·----·-------·- 17, 18, 19, 20

Urban Land Company vs. Shreveport, (La.) 162
So. 7 4_7 ( 1935) -----·-·----------------------------------------·-·--·-· 17

Wightman vs. Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P. 2d 471 (1956) --·-·---·------- 12

AUTHORITIES CITED
Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, Presumptions and
Burden of Proof ( 1947) ·--·---------------------------· 11, 15

.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GARY L. REICH, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
Case No.
12890

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY SUBURBAN
SANITARY DISTRICT NO. I,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover for damages suffered when sewage poured into plaintiffs' homes
from defendant's sewer line.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The separate actions of the four homeowner plaintiffs were consolidated for trial on the issue of liability
I

only and were tried before Judge Marcellus K. Snow
sitting with a jury which returned a general verdict in
favor of defendant ( R. 7 4-7 5). Judge Snow granted a
new trial and the liability issue was retried before Judge
Joseph G. Jeppson who submitted the case to the jury
on a Special Verdict ( R. 123-12 5) . When the jury first
returned the Special Verdict and as it was being polled,
it became evident that it had not followed the instructions of the Court and that the verdict returned did not
conform to instruction No. 12. The Court then refused to
receive the verdict and the next morning after giving
further instruction, sent the jury out for further deliberation (R. 126; 326-331 and 337). The jury returned a
verdict (R. 342-347 and 123-125) generally favoring
the respondents.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purposes of this brief, the appellant shall be
referred to as "defendant" and the respondents shall be
ref erred to as "plaintiffs."
The defendant in October, 1968 was the owner of a
sewer line, serving plaintiffs' homes, which sewer line is
eight inches in diameter except where it crosses the b~lt
route above plaintiffs' homes where it is ten inches 111
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diameter. Below the belt route it is reduced again to an
eight inch diameter ( R. 245) and is laid along the following route, ( R. 203-204) :
From an area shown on Exhibit 4P near
Wasatch Hills westerly across Wasatch Blvd.
and the Belt Route, to Millcreek Road, then west
along Millcreek Road to Terrace View where the
line turns North and runs north along Terrace
View where the plaintiffs' homes are located. The
line eventually runs to 3300 South. (R. 20I-204
and 255; Ex. IP and 4P).
The sewer line as described above (and referred to
herein as sewer line) serves homes above and below W asatch Blvd. along the designated route (R. 255). Each
home served by the eight inch sewer line is connected by
means of a four inch lateral (R. 203).
The defendant at present, as well as in October,
1968, is responsible for the maintenance, inspection and
repair of the sewer line and there is no other party having
any responsibility or right to manage or operate said
sewer line. In addition, the defendant is responsible for
maintenance of the four inch laterals from the sewer line
to the property line of the home to which they are connected. (R. 203-205). The plaintiff's homes are located
just north of the intersection of Millcreek Road and
Terrace View where the eight inch sewer line makes a
90° turn and the slope or grade of the line along Millcreek Road is greater ( 2.38 %) than the slope after the
line turns down Terrace View (1.44%). (R. 255-256
and Ex. IP).
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On Monday, October 7, 1968, at approximately
7 :15 a.m., the basement of plaintiffs' homes were flooded
by raw selvage pouring from the toilets, wash basins and
drains connected to defendant's eight inch sewer line.
(R. 207-208; 218-219 and 212-214). The sewage was
spurting three to four feet high out of the toilets (R.
207-208 and 213) . There was sufficient pressure to
break a metal drain cover in the Figgat home (R. 213. ,
214). The raw sewage which thus entered the plaintiffs'
homes reached a level in the basement of as high as eight
inches, covering the entire basement (R. 208). The level
varied in each of the plaintiffs' homes. Although only
two of the plaintiffs testified at the second trial, it was '
stipulated that the flooding did occur in all four plain·
tiffs' homes (R. 197-219}. The flooding lasted for ap·
proximately 45 minutes to an hour (R. 215). At 8:20 :
a.m. when defendant's employee arrived, the sewage was
flowing in the eight inch line again, although he saw evi·
dence of sewage back-up in a manhole (R. 316). The
sewer line below plaintiffs' homes was checked and the
employee's report stated,
1

1

"Pulled manhole, took manhole lids along Ter·
race View north to 33rd South. All sewage flows
down and flowing through inverts, no indication
of sewage being backed into manholes. The first
manhole south of 33rd found and removed from
manhole invert. Two pieces of brick, some heavy
rock and gravel. Rechecked and remirrored man·
hole to manhole section of Terrace View for fur·
ther obstruction or trouble. Sewage flow and line
now seemed normal.
4

This is Page 2 : Very bad and large volume of
sewage flooded into basements on floor and
shower drains and toilets. All owners starting to
clean basements. Sewage flowing back down
through floor drains. Called District Office to ask
Mr. Davenport to survey damage and to let Mr.
Brinton know of trouble. Mr. Davenport came up
and started damage survey and report.'' ( R. 317)
The minutes of a meeting of the Board of Trustees
of defendant held Thursday, October 17, 1968, ten days
after the flood, contain the following:
"The manager reported that 6 homes were flooded from sewer backing up into the homes on the
morning off October 7, 1968. The flooding had
been relieved by 8 :30 or 9 :00 and some rocks and
building materials were removed from the sewer.
It is thought this difficulty was caused by a break
in the sewer caused October 2, 1968, where the
freeway was being worked upon." (Ex. 2-P)
On October 2, 1968 at about 9 :00 a.m., five days
before the plaintiffs' homes were flooded with sewage,
the defendant's sewer line, which serves plaintiffs'
homes, was broken by Gibbons & Reed Construction
Company at a point near the non-access line of the Belt
Route, marked by an "X" on Exhibit 4-P. The pipe has
a ten inch diameter at the point of the break and reduces
to eight inches a short distance below the break and before reaching plaintiffs' home. The point of the break is
approximately 1500 feet above plaintiffs' homes. (R.
306). The break in the pipe was described by Mr. Ancell, a field inspector for an engineering firm employed
by the defendant,
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"Well, the whole top of this tile pipe was taken
off; probably, I remember and think I have
stated bef~re, it was p~obably three feet of the top
taken off. There was Just the bottom portion of 1t
still existing." ( R. 240)
He further testified that sewage was flowing through
the pipe which was in a hole approximately ten feet be·
low the ground level and that there were "a few pieces
laying around" after the break (R. 241). Mr. Ancell
then "inspected" the break, but he did not look downstream inside the pipe, he merely looked at the outside of
the ten inch pipe and saw the sewage running in it. (R.
242) . The pipe which was broken was to be changed
later the day it was broken so the break was not repaired,
and sewage was permitted to run through the broken
pipe for six or seven hours (R. 244). A piece of plywood
was later placed over the break. The defendant was no·
tified of the break at approximately 4 :30 p.m., October
2, 1968. In spite of the-fact that a ten inch pipe which
joins an eight inch pipe had a three foot hole broken into
it, the inside of the pipe was never inspected (R. 241·
242 and 309) . When the line was changed to the new
line, the tile in the new pipe was broken with a hammer
allowing the sewage to run in the new pipe. This pro·
cedure makes it possible for broken pieces of pipe to
enter the line (R. 247).
Mr. Alvin Anderson, a civil sanitary engineer with
extensive experience ( R. 234-235) , made a study of the
engineering data and circumstances surrounding the
flooding of plaintiffs' homes (R. 254-255), and as a re·
sult of his study was of the opinion that the eight inch
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sewer line became plugged somewhere on Terrace View
Drive below the Atwood and Figgat homes. (Ex. 1-P).
That point was selected because homes north of plaintiffs' were not flooded and the flatter part of the sewer is
just after the turn onto Terrace View. The flatter part
of the sewer would have less velocity and hence permit
something dense enough to be suspended in a steeper
pipe to come to rest in the flatter part-Terrace View
(R. 274-275). He stated that based upon the engineer's
data and the sewage levels in the basements at the time
of the flood, there would have been a force of 17 4
pounds, in other words the plug as a whole had to be put
under a force of 17 4 pounds in order to cause it to move.
(R. 269-271). This would lead to the conclusion that the
cause of the plug would have to have been something
rather dense, like a rock or brick, which would come to
rest and allow sewage to flow by it and collect upon it,
thus forming the plug ( R. 271) . It was further his opinion that in view of the fact that four inch lines empty into
eight inch lines with large capacity and velocity that an
item large and dense enough to have caused the plug in
question would have caused the plug in the four inch
line if it had entered that way. When asked what could
have gone through a four inch pipe and plug up the
eight inch sewer line, he stated that, "I can't fully appreciate that anything could." ( R. 273). Based upon the
engineering data, it was Mr. Anderson's opinion that
something entering the sewer line as a result of the break
October 2, 1968, could have caused the flood into plaintiffs' homes on October 7, 1968.
7

The special verdict of the jury wa~ as follows: (R.
124-125).

Proposition No. 1
The defendant, Sewer District, had responsible
control of the sewer line. True

Proposition No. 2
The defendant, Sewer District, had exclusive
control of the sewer line at the time the said line
wa~ plugged. False

Proposition No. 3
The flooding that occurred in the homes of the
plaintiffs was of such a nature that it would not
have happened in the ordinary course of things if
the defendant, sewer district, had used due care.
True
Proposition No. 4
The circumstances were such that the defendant, sewer district, was in a better position than
the plaintiffs to-know what specific conduct was
the cause of the flooding. True
Proposi,tion No. 5
The flooding of plaintiffs' homes resulted from
some act or omission by the defendant, Sewer
District, in its operation of the sewer line. True
Proposition No. 6
The flooding of the homes of the plaintiffs was
proximately caused by the negligence of the defendant, sewer district. True
The trial court made Findings of Fact a portion of
which relating to liability is as follows:
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"3. That on October 7, 1968, and for several

weeks before and after said date, the defendant
was the owner of the sewage system which served
the plaintiffs' homes and was responsible for the
construction, operation, maintenance, inspection
and repair of the said sewage system.
4. That the sewer line serving plaintiffs' homes
was broken on or about October 2, 1968 at a point
approximately 1500 feet above plaintiffs' homes
resulting in a hole in the said line three feet long
by eight inches wide. That after said break,
sewage was allowed to run through the line for
approximately seven hours before it was transferred to the new pipeline, which served plaintiffs' homes.

5. That the defendant, sewer district, was given
notice of the break on the day the break in the
line occurred. An inspector employed by the defendant, sewer district's consulting engineer, to
inspect construction of the sewer in the area of
the break was notified immediately after the
break occurred, and he notified the defendant,
sewer district, the same day.
6. That on October 7, 1968, raw sewage poured

from defendant's sewer line under pressure into
each of the plaintiff's basements, flooding the said
basements with several inches of raw sewage.
7. That although the sewer line could have been

inspected for discovery of foreign material after
notice of the break and before the plaintiffs'
homes were flooded, the sewer district, did not inspect the sewer line for foreign material until
after the plaintiffs' homes were flooded ...
9. The court finds based on the evidence and the
said special verdict that the defendant was negli-

9

gent in the operation and maintenance of its
sewer line and that said negligence was the prox.
imate cause of the discharge of sewer from the de.
fendant's sewer line into the homes of the plain.
tiffs and each of them." (R. 162-163)
Judgment was entered as follows:

'.'l. That the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs
m ea~h of the abov:e entitled cases for damages
sustamed by the plamtiffs and each of them prox·
imately resulting from the discharge of sewage
f~om the defendant's sewer line into the respective homes of the said plaintiffs on October 7,
1968.
2. That the issue as to the amount of damages suf.
fered by the plaintiffs in each case is reserved for
trial before the above court at a future date." (R.
169)

RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF POINTS
l. THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR

IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE
INSTANT CASE.
2. THE DECISION OF THE COURT AND

JURY AMOUNT TO A FINDING OF ACTUAL
NEGLIGENCE AND ARE SUPPORTED EY
THE EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR
IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE
INSTANT CASE.
10

I.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits one who
suffers injury from something under the control of another to present his grievance to a court or jury on the
basis of an inference of negligence drawn upon the facts
of the particular case. This then casts the burden of
proof of what happened and lack of negligence upon the
defendant. Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Company, 10
U 2d 276, 351 P. 2d 952 (1960).
Appellant in its brief bases its entire argument upon
the question of the control required to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and does not dispute the proof
of the other elements, (appellant's brief, p. 10). In view
of this, respondents in their argument will confine themselves to the question of control.
The English case of Scott v. The Lodon and St.
Katherine Dock Company, 3 H & C 596, 13 W.R. 410;
13L T 148; 159 Eng. RRP, 665 (1865), states the definition of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which has been
universally accepted as an accurate definition of the
Doctrine. See Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, Presumptions
and Burden of Proof, p. 20 (1947):
"But where the thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and
the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of
care."
The above landmark case involved a barrel of flour
which fell upon the plaintiff. In discussing the ruling,
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the term "management of the defendant" was used and
the term "exclusive control" was not.
Several Utah cases have dealt with the element of
control in res ipsa loquitur cases. In Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 5 Utah 2d 373, 302 P. 2d 471
(1956), the following discussion appears:

"This requisite is generally pharsed in terms of
'exclusive control' over the instrumentality which '
caused the injury. However, as pointed out by
Dean Prosser, the use of such terminology is
often not realistically applicable to the situation.
He makes reference to examples of malfunction·
ing machinery, defective appliances and other sit·
uations where the instrumentality has passed beyond the control of the person responsible for its
condition and is being used by and under the com·
plete control of the plaintiff. As suggested by
that eminent authority, it would seem more accu·
rate to appraise the situation in terms of the defendant's respmisibility for the instrumentality,
its condition or function, rather than merely its
control. Whether it is in the defendant's exclu·
sive control or not, if the evidence reasonably
eliminates other explanations than the defend·
ant's negligence, that provides the basis upon
which the jury may be permitted to infer that it
was defendant's negligence which resulted in the
" .
,,
IDJury.
In another case involving natural gas pipes, Lund
v. Mountain Fuel, 15 Utah 2d 10, 386 P. 2d 408 (1936),
where an unexplained break occurred in the defendant's
gas main located in a public street and some trees and
shrubs on plaintiff's property were damaged, it was
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stated with respect to control that "The cause thereof
was something under the management or control of the
defendant or for which it is responsible." With respect
to the interpretation of the facts, the Court stated:
"We are aware that there are cases in other jurisdictions which have held the evidence in the instant case without evidence of other negligence
would be insufficient to invoke the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur so as to permit the submission of the
question of respondent's negligence to a jury.
However, we are not impressed with their reasoning as applied to the evidence in the instant
case and are not inclined to follow such cases.
Since the sole responsibility for the installation,
maintenance and inspection of the gas pipe is respondent's appellant having proved it breakage
and consequent damage to his property through
no act of his own has carried his burden of proof,
and the duty to rebut the inference of lack of due
care should be upon respondent."
In addition to the natural gas cases above cited, the
Utah Supreme Court has spoken concerning the element
of control required to submit a case to the jury on the
element of res ipsa loquitur.

A bathtub leg in a motel gave way causing injury
to the plaintiff who was in the bathtub in Moore v.
James, 5 Utah 2d 91, 297 P. 2d 221 (1956). The trial
court had refused to instruct the jury on the res ipsa loquitur rule. On appeal the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court holding at page 224:
"The trial court in the case at bar apparently believed that the plaintiff's temporary use of the
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bathtub or 'participation' removed the bathtub
from the management and control of the def endants. True, the leg would not have collapsed had
no one used the bathtub, but defendants had at all
times the ownership, management and control of
the bathtub, and had full opportunity to inspect
the bathtub and acertain its actual defective condition. Plaintiff, on the other hand, had the right
to assume the bathtub would be free from defects
that might cause injury, except as to obvious defects and was under no duty to spect prior to using. In the Gow case, above, the plaintiff sat on a
stool at a lunchcounter which collapsed injuring
him. This case is directly in point with the case at
bar. The court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied and plaintiff recovered.
We are of the opinion that the defendants had the
responsible control of the bathtub and legs sup·
porting it which caused plaintiffs injuries in tins
case; that the accident was of a kind which, in the
ordinary course of events, would not have happened if the defendants had used due care; and
that the evidence excluded the plaintiff as a re·
sponsible cause. It may be fairly said, therefore,
that there was an inference of negligence on the
part of the defendants when the leg collapsed,
and we hold that the court's refusal to submit the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the jury was
error." (Emphasis added.)
In Sanone v. J. C. Penney Company, 17 Utah 2d
46 404 P. 2d 248 ( 1965), as a mother and child were
descending upon an escalator, the child cried, "Mommy,
my foot is caught"; her mother pulled her up into her
arms. Skin and muscle tissue of the girl's leg were severly torn. The defendant stated that it did not know the
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cause of the accident. In affirming the verdict relying
upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the Court stated
that because of the nature of an escalator, it was impossible for the plaintiff to know or show what caused the
injury. In addition the Court held that the escalator was
under the exclusive control of the defendant citing the
Lund case and James cases cited above and stating that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur authorized the jury to
draw an inference of negligence. It was also stated, "It is
plain that if the jury were required also to find specific
acts of negligence the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would
be nullified . . ."
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied
by the Utah Courts as well as courts of other jurisdiction
to a tremendous variety of instrumentalities, see Shain
Res Ipsa Loquitur Presumptions and Burden of Proof
(1947), page 427, Table of Contents, for a partial listing.
Rather than the narrow interpretation defendant
suggests, from the above cases it can be seen that the
term "control" as used in stating the elements of res ipsa
loquitur has been defined several ways and applied to
many factual situations where the defendant is not in a
position to exclude outside influence altogether (i.e.,
bathtub, escalator, smoke stack in Lund v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 10 U 2d 276, 351P.2d 952 (1960) ). In the
instant case we are concerned with a sewer line which
was owned and constructed by the defendant and the defendant is responsible for its maintenance and inspection, (R. 10-12). The sewer line by its nature is designed
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and managed to anticipate unusual objects entering it
( R. 272 and 305) and is such that it can only be inspect.
ed and maintained by the defendant as he owns the line
and has a staff of engineers, inspectors and others at his
disposal. The plaintiffs on the other hand do not have
the access, equipment or ability to inspect or maintain the
defendant's sewer line. Plaintiffs obviously have no way
of exercising any control of any kind over the sewer
lines running under the public streets to which their
homes' sewers are connected.
The tests for control as enunciated in the cases set
out above are the ownership, inspection, maintenance, or •
responsible control not literally exclusive as defendant
argues. In the Coca Cola cases as cited by defendant, he
is trying to compare a bottle which leaves the possession
of the manufacturer and which is not available for inspection by the manufacturer defendant as it is out of •
his possession and as there are millions of such bottles all i
in different locations. In the instant case, the defendant ·
maintains the possession of the sewer line, maintains the
responsibility for its inspection and maintains the re·
sponsibility for is maintenance (R. 10-12). Defendant
can, at any time, inspect, clean or repair it. On October
2, 1968, defendant had notice of a large break in the,
sewer line above plaintiffs' homes (R. 245). Plaintiffs
had no way of knowing of such break. Given these facts,:
defendant who knew of the break, could have inspected'
the sewer line for foreign material as a result of this
break, but no such inspection was made (R. 308-310).
In the experience of the manager of defendant, this is the
1
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first time four homes have been flooded at one time (R.
206).

Defendant has cited a Wisconsin case, Freitag v.
City of Montello, 153 N\V 2d 505 (Wis. 1967), to support his proposition. However, in that case, there was no
break or other obvious malfunction or defect in the sewer
and the Court made a rather strict construction of control, a construction which the Utah Supreme Court has
held is not the law in Utah, see Moore v. James and
Lund v. Mountain Fuel, supra. It should be noted that
at page 509 of the Wisconsin Opinion, the Court, after
referring to several cases from other jurisdiction, recognizing res ipsa loquitur in sewer flooding cases, distinguished them by saying, "The majority of them (cases
from other jurisdictions) are cases involving a break in
the sewer pipe." (parenthesis added). In other jurisdictions, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied
in cases where sewers have flooded back through drains
as was the situation in the instant case. See Talcott v.
New York, 69 NYS 360 (N. Y. 1901). Anello v. Kansas City, 286 S\V 2d 49 (Mo. app. 1955). Urban Land
Co. v. Shreveport, (La.) 162 So. 747 (1935). City of
Elkhart v. Slabaugh, (Ind. app. 1959), 157 NE 2d 842
(Ind. 1959).
In the Urban Land Co. case, sewage had backed
into homes on several occassions and it was not possible
to determine the cause. The Court held that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in this situation. In
the Talcott case, some debris was removed from the
sewer, however there was no explanation of how the ob17

struction occurred. In holding that the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was applicable to the case, the New York
Court stated:
"But where an appliance like a sewer is under the
exclusive management and control of the rnuni·
cipal officers upon whom there is imposed an
active duty of watchfulness and care to prevent
an obstruction which would result in causing
damages to abutting property, and without the
happening of any extraordmary event which
would cause an obstruction, the sewer became obstructed and an abutting owner's property was
injured. Thereby, it seems to me that the case is
one from which a presumption of negligence
arises as would call upon the defendant to show
what watchfulness and care he had exercised to
keep the sewer in proper order, a finding that
there was negligence would be sustained."
See also Rotella v. McGovern, 288 A. 2d 261 (RI
1972).
"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur simply calls
upon the defendant, after proof of the accident,
to give such evidence as will exonerate him if any
there be, and relieves the plaintiff from the burden of proving the non-existence of an adequate
explaantion or excuse." Talcott v. New York,
69 NYS 360 (NY 1901).
The other two cases cited above, Anello and City of
Elkhart, where res ipsa loquitur was applied are cases
involving a broken sewer line as in the instant case.
The problem of sewage backing up through sewers
from the main line in a public street, which sewers are
designed and operated with the expectation of unusual
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items entering them is something which does not ordinarily occur without some negligence as in the instant case,
and is something in which the victims have no way of
guarding against, instead, they and the public as a whole
have to place their entire trust in those who own and are
responsible for the inspection and maintenance of the
sewer lines to see that the line does not become obstructed as in Talcott v. New York, supra, there is a duty of
watchfulness imposed to prevent obstructions from
forming. In the instant case, defendant had at least four
(4) days to inspect the sewer line for foreign objects
after it knew of the three foot by ten inch break in its
line. The minutes of defendant's own Board of Trustees
meeting of October 17, 1972, indicated that defendant
thought the break in the sewer line was the cause of the
flood, (Ex. 2-P). Plaintiffs' expert, whose opinions
were not contradicted, indicated that an object entering
the sewer pipe at the break could have caused the flood
five (5) days later as a heavy object would tend to move
in steps and rest in the flatter part of the sewer line on
Terrace View. (R. 274).
In view of the impossibility of individuals connected
to sewer lines to protect against the backup of sewage
into their homes; the rarety with which backup occurs,
particularly without some negligence; the duty of those
responsible to inspect the line; the position of the owner
of the sewer having personnel and equipment available
to inspect the sewer lines; the complete lack of knowledge of those injured as to operations of a sewer line; the
unlikelyhood of one flooded causing the backup as an ob-
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ject would have to get through a four inch line to cause
a backup in an eight inch line; the element of control '
should be defined as responsible control as it has been in
Utah and is applied in many jurisdictions, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be held to be applicable
to blockages of sewer lines such as the instant case where
the sewer line in the public street belonging to the defendant is clearly the one which is blocked. In the instant
case, considering the break in the sewer, there is even
stronger reason for the application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur.
2. THE DECISION OF THE COURT AND

JURY AMOUNT TO A FINDING OF ACTUAL
NEGLIGENCE AND ARE SUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.
As stated in Talcott v. New Yark and Rotella v.
McGovern, supra, the owner of a sewer line has a duty to
inspect and see that the sewer is functioning properly.
In the instant case, this duty was breached as the sewer
line was not even inspected during the four day period
between the break in the line and the flood when the defendant had actual knowledge of the broken ten inch
sewer line (R. 242 and 308-309), which emptied into an
eight inch line and had ample time to make such inspection (R. 241-242 and 309). Defendant's manager testified as to methods defendant had available to inspect the
sewer line including mirroring, rodding and use of T.V.
( R. 303-304) . Plaintiffs' expert witness testified that
mirroring of sewer lines is a common technique em·
20
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ployed in the sewer industry to determine if debris or
foreign materials are in the sewer pipe ( R. 27 5) . After
the flood of plaintiffs' homes defendant's employees
mirrored the sewer line and then re-mirrored it after
finding the bricks and rocks at 33rd South (R. 116). It
is not contested that defendant had the necessary equipment to perform such an inspection.
In its special verdict, the jury found that the flooding of plaintiffs' homes resulted from some act or omission by defendant. (R. 125). This act or omission could
be found by reasonable men to be defendant's failure to
inspect the sewer line after notice of the rather large
break. The jury further found that the negligence of defendant was the proximate cause of the flooding of plaintiffs' homes (R. 125). This finding is supported by the
evidence of the size of the break ( R. 241); the larger
pipe in which the break occurred, emptying into a smaller pipe (R. 202-203 and 240); the expert testimony describing the engineering data ( R. 254-276) ; the testimony concerning the location of the plug ( R. 270-27 4);
the requirement that the plug be rather dense ( R. 271) ;
that the place the plug occurred was the flattest part of
the sewer and most likely location for a dense object to
be deposited ( R. 27 4-27 5) ; that by the nature of a sewer
an object entering the point of the break on October 2,
1968 could have caused the plug resulting in the flooding on October 7, 1968 (R. 274-275); that the expert
knew of nothing which could enter the eight inch line
through a four inch lateral and by itself cause a plug as
in the instant case (R. 273); that the defendant had no-
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tice of the break but did not inspect the inside of the pipe
(R. 241-242 and 308-309); that defendant's manager
knew of no other flooding where four homes were flooded by sweage at one time (R. 206) and also was not
aware of any other break in his experiences of the magnitude of the three foot by ten inch break in the instant
case (R. 308).
The evidence is sufficient to support a findings of
actual negligence and the judgment of the trial court
should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the law as it has been established in
Utah as well as other jurisdictions relating to the element
of control necessary to invoke the doctrine of re~ ipsa lo·
quitur, the rseponsible control of responsibility for man·
agement, inspection, and maintenance of the instrumen·
tality are the necessary requirements for sufficient control to satisfy the elements of res ipsa loquitur. Under the
circumstances of the instant case, a sewer line is designed
and operated to handle a large variety of items and oh·
jects and as found by the jury the flood of the plaintiffs'
homes was of such a nature that it would not have hap·
pened in the ordinary course of things if the defendant
had used care. It is not contradicted that defendant ~
owned, operated, inspected, managed and maintained
the sewer line. The jury, in view of the circumstances
should be permitted to infer the negligence of defendant
from the flood itself.
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In addition, and as an alternative, the evidence in
the case supports a finding of actual negligence against
defendant through his failure to inspect the sewer line
after notice of the break.
Considering the evidence and the law, the elements
necessary for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
Joquitur have been fully established. In the alternative,
actual negligence has been established. The judgment
should therefore be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. J. SKEEN
R.C.SKEEN
SKEEN AND SKEEN
536 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Attorneys for Respondents
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